






































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ROBERT MCCOY, individually and on 




ALPHABET, INC. et al., 
Defendant. 
 
Case No.  20-cv-05427-SVK    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 




Defendant Google, LLC1 (“Defendant”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff Robert McCoy’s 
(“Plaintiff”) class action Complaint (Dkt. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  Dkt. 24.  The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate 
judge.  Dkts. 14, 22. 
The Court held a hearing on January 19, 2021.  Dkts. 40, 42.  After considering the Parties’ 
submissions, arguments at the hearing, the case file, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN 
PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the reasons discussed below. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This discussion of the background facts is based on the allegations of Plaintiff’s 
Complaint.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has been using an internal program called “Android 
Lockbox” to monitor and collect sensitive personal data when users use non-Google applications 
 
1 Defendant Alphabet, Inc. was dismissed on September 8, 2020, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  Dkt. 21.  





































































(“apps”) on their Android smartphones.  Dkt. 1 ¶ 4.  Personal data collected includes when and 
how often the non-Google apps are used and the amount of time a user spends on the non-Google 
apps.  Id. at ¶¶ 25, 40.  Plaintiff alleges that while Defendant claims its practices are authorized, 
this is not the case and Defendant’s Privacy Policy does not adequately disclose or seek consent to 
monitor, collect, or use Android smartphone user’s sensitive personal data while using the non-
Google apps.  Id. at ¶ 27.  Further, while users are told Defendant will collect personal data “to 
offer a more personalized experience,” this is not true and Defendant uses the sensitive personal 
data to “obtain lucrative behind the scenes technical insight that it can use to develop competing 
apps against its competitors.  Id. at ¶ 33, 36-38. 
On August 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a class action Complaint in this action.  Dkt. 1.  
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on September 30, 2020 and the motion to dismiss hearing was 
held on January 19, 2021.  Dkts. 24, 40, 42.   
III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
Defendant asks this Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 2A-2D, 3, 4, and 5 attached 
to the Declaration of Christina Lee (“Lee Declaration” or “Lee Decl.”).  Dkt. 25.  Defendant 
further argues that Exhibits 1, 2A-2D, and 3 can also be considered under the doctrine of 
incorporation by reference. 
A. Legal Standard 
There are two doctrines that allow district courts to consider material outside the pleadings 
without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment: judicial notice under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and incorporation by reference.  Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, 
Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Hagan v. Khoja, — U.S. —, 139 S. 
Ct. 2615, 204 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2019).  “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).  A fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute” if it “is 
generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).  However, “[j]ust because the 
document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within 
that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.”  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999.   





































































Incorporation by reference is a judicially created doctrine that allows a court to consider 
certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002.  “The 
doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that support their claims, 
while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken—or doom—their claims.”  Id.  A 
defendant can seek to incorporate a document into the complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively 
to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”  U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 
F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).  While the “mere mention” of the existence of a document is 
insufficient to incorporate a document, it is proper to incorporate a document if the claim 
“necessarily depended” on them.  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. 
After a defendant offers such a document, the district court can treat the document as part 
of the complaint, and “thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”  Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.  However, “[w]hile this is generally true, 
it is improper to assume the truth of an incorporated document if such assumptions only serve to 
dispute facts stated in a well-pleaded complaint.”  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1003.  Indeed, using 
extrinsic documents to “resolve competing theories against the complaint risks premature 
dismissals of plausible claims that may turn out to be valid after discovery” and it is “improper to 
do so only to resolve factual disputes against the plaintiff’s well-pled allegations in the 
complaint.”  Id. at 998, 1014. 
B. Analysis 
Exhibit 1 is a copy of the article “Internal Google Program Taps Data on Rival Android 
Apps,” which was published in The Information.  Dkt. 25 at 2; Dkt. 25-2.  Defendant asks the 
Court to take judicial notice of this document because it is a publicly available webpage and not 
subject to reasonable dispute.  Dkt. 25 at 4.  Defendant also argues that the Court should treat the 
article as incorporated by reference because Plaintiff relies and quotes from this article.  Id. at 5.  
Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s request, arguing that the article is not judicially noticeable because 
“the meaning of the specific statements that Google seeks to have judicially noticed are at the 
center of this dispute and subject to multiple interpretations.”  Dkt. 30 at 4.  “It is well-established 
that ‘[c]ourts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to indicate what was in the public 





































































realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in fact true.’”  In re Google 
Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 813 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010)).  The Court therefore takes 
judicial notice of the fact that The Information published allegations contained in the article, but 
not of the truth of those allegations.  Here, Defendant is not asking the Court to treat the contents 
of the article as true, so the Court need not reach the issue of incorporation by reference.  See id. 
(reasoning that Defendants are not asking the Court to treat the news report as true and “indeed, 
they dispute its truth”).  Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the article, but not of the 
truth of the article.  The request for judicial notice of Exhibit A is GRANTED.  
Defendant also asks the Court to consider Exhibits 2A-2D, which include various versions 
of Defendant’s Privacy Policy, and Exhibit 3, Defendant’s Terms of Service (“TOS”).  Dkts. 25 at 
2; 25-3-25-7.  Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of these documents because they 
are from publicly available webpages and not subject to reasonable dispute.  Dkt. 25 at 4.  
Defendant also contends that the Court should treat these documents as incorporated by reference 
because Plaintiff’s “claims repeatedly cite and necessarily depend on Google’s Privacy Policy and 
TOS.”  Dkt. 25 at 5.  Plaintiff contends that it would be improper to incorporate by reference 
Defendant’s current version of its Privacy Policy, which was updated on August 28, 2020, after 
this Complaint was filed.  Dkt. 30 at 8.  However, the Privacy Policy and the TOS are referenced 
extensively throughout the Complaint and form the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.  See, e.g., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 
37-40, 68, 101, 103, 138-40, 142-43, 149, 152-53, 156, and nn.2, 6-7, 8-9, 11.  Additionally, 
Plaintiff cites to and relies on Defendant’s submissions, including the current version of 
Defendant’s Privacy Policy, in Plaintiff’s opposition brief.  Accordingly, Defendant’s request to 
incorporate by reference the various versions of the Privacy Policy (Dkts. 25-4-25-6) and the TOS 
(Dkt. 25-7) is GRANTED.  See in re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 813-14 
(granting Google’s request to incorporate by reference the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy). 
Lastly, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit 4, Defendant’s “Share 
usage & diagnostics information with Google” support webpage, and Exhibit 5, Defendant’s “See 
& control your Web & App Activity.”  Dkts. 25 at 2-3; 25-8-25-9.  Defendant argues that these 





































































documents “are publicly available webpages, and not subject to reasonable dispute.”  Dkt. 25 at 4.  
The Court takes judicial notice of these webpages for the fact that Defendant made these 
statements, but not for the truth of those statements.  The request for judicial notice is 
GRANTED.    
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Legal standard  
1. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  Article III standing is a threshold requirement for 
federal court jurisdiction.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 
119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).  The party seeking standing must show that “(1) he or she has suffered 
an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court 
decision.”  Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351).  
A party moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may make a facial challenge by asserting 
that “the allegations contained in [the] complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 
jurisdiction.”  Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Court 
“must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in 
favor of the complaining party.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 
343 (1975).  “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations 
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 
S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only 
“the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the 





































































court may take judicial notice.”  Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 
1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the 
court must assume the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).  However, the court is 
not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 
fact, or unreasonable inferences.”  In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citation omitted).  
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege “enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).  This “facial plausibility” standard requires the 
plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).  
Courts should freely give leave to amend unless the district court determines that it is clear 
that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.  Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 
245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).  When amendment would be futile, the court may dismiss without leave 
to amend.  Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 
B. Analysis 
Plaintiff alleges that the issue in this case is Defendant’s collection of third-party-app 
usage.  Dkt. 1 ¶ 24.  Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant collects information on “when and 
how often an Android Smartphone user opens and runs non-Google apps and the amount of time 
spent in non-Google apps.”  Id. at ¶ 25; Dkt. 42 25:23-26:9; 35:21-22.  Further, Plaintiff alleges 
Defendant uses this information “to gain an unfair advantage against its competitors in other 
industries, including social media platforms and applications such as TikTok, Facebook, and 
Instagram.”  Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 3, 29-30, 32, 36-38, 42; Dkt. 42 7:4-11.  From this practice, Plaintiff asserts 
eleven claims: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) invasion of privacy; (3) violation of California 
Civil Code § 1709; (4) violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act; (5) violation of 
California Unfair Competition Law; (6) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies 
Act; (7) breach of contract; (8) breach of implied contract; (9) unjust enrichment; (10) request for 





































































relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act; and (11) request for relief under California’s Invasion 
of Privacy Act.  Defendant asserts an overarching argument that the Complaint should be 
dismissed in its entirety because Defendant disclosed its data collection practices in its Privacy 
Policy, and Plaintiff consented to that policy.  Defendant also asserts arguments as to why each 
claim individually should be dismissed. 
1. Consent 
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff fails to allege an actual injury as required by the 
Article III standing requirements because Plaintiff consented to share his third-party-app usage 
data with Defendant.  Dkt. 24 at 15.  Defendant contends that Plaintiff acknowledges that he 
consented to share this data with Defendant and that Defendant disclosed how it might use that 
data in its Privacy Policy.  Id.  Further, Defendant argues that Defendant’s disclosures and 
Plaintiff’s consent are “an absolute defense to all claims under Rule 12(b)(6).”  Id. at 16.   
“[C]onsent is not an all-or-nothing proposition.”  In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-
LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).  Indeed, “[c]onsent is only effective if 
the person alleging harm consented to ‘the particular conduct, or to substantially the same 
conduct’ and if the alleged tortfeasor did not exceed the scope of that consent.”  In re Google 
Location History Litig., 428 F. Supp. 3d 185, 190 (citing Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 
1064, 1072-73 (N.D. Cal. 2016)).  Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that he is “subject to Google’s 
privacy policy, which is incorporated into the contract through the TOS.”  Dkt. 1 ¶ 140.  
Therefore, the question before the Court is whether the Privacy Policy adequately discloses to 
users that Defendant collects their information regarding use of third-party-apps and then uses that 
information to its competitive advantage such that users could fairly be said to have “consented” 
to these disclosures.  In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 823.  The Court 
considers this question objectively from “the perspective of a reasonable . . . user.”  Id. (quoting In 
re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 789 (N.D. Cal. 
2019)). 
The Privacy Policy that was in place at the time the Complaint was filed (Dkt. 25-5) and  
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the most recently updated Privacy Policy (Dkt. 25-3)2 have several provisions that address 
Defendant’s collection and use of information:   
 
We want you to understand the types of information we collect as 
you use our services 
 
We collect information to provide better services to all our users – 
from figuring out basic stuff like which language you speak, to more 
complex things like which ads you’ll find most useful, the people who 
matter most to you online, or which YouTube videos you might like.  
The information Google collects, and how that information is used, 
depends on how you use our services and how you manage your 




Information we collect as you use our services 
Your apps, browsers & devices 
 
We collect information about the apps, browsers, and devices you use 
to access Google services, which helps us provide features like 
automatic product updates and dimming your screen if your battery 






We collect information about your activity in our services, which we 
use to do things like recommend a YouTube video you might like. 
The activity information we collect may include… 
 








Develop new services   
 
We use the information we collect in existing services to help us 
develop new ones.  For example, understanding how people 
organized their photos in Picasa, Google’s first photos app, helped us 





2 Both of which the Court has incorporated by reference, see supra Section III.B. 









































































[I]nformation about the interaction of your apps, browsers, and 
devices with our services (like IP address, crash reports, and system 
activity); and activity on third-party sites and apps that use our 









Research and development: Google uses information to improve 
our services and to develop new products, features and technologies 
that benefit our users and the public.  For example, we use publicly 
available information to help train Google’s language models and 
build features like Google Translate.  
 
Dkts. 25-5 at 3-4, 6, 17, 18; 25-3 at 3-4, 6, 17, 18. 
Defendant argues that from these statements “a reasonable person would understand that Google 
collects third-party-app usage data for a wide range of purposes, including the development of 
new products and services.”  Dkt. 24 at 16.   
On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that the language is vague, using only general terms 
about the information Defendant may collect and how it may use that information.  Dkt. 29 at 9, 
28-29.  Thus, Plaintiff argues, the language “could not be construed by a reasonable person to 
cover the conduct alleged in the Complaint” and therefore “Plaintiff and other Android users could 
not have consented to Google’s misconduct.”  Id. at 9, 29.  By way of example, in its opposition 
and at the hearing, Plaintiff argued that the Privacy Policy statement, “we collect information 
about  your activity in our services, which we use to do things like recommend a YouTube video 
you might like” would not be interpreted by a reasonable person to mean that Defendant collects 
data about third-party apps that are not associated with Google.  Id. at 27.  Similarly, Plaintiff 
points to “activity on third-party sites and apps that use our services” as suggesting a limited range 
of collecting, such as of data from Google’s own apps or apps that use Google’s services.  Id. at 
28-29.  As to how Defendant uses the information it collects, Plaintiff argues that in addition to 
generally vague, indeterminate language, the Privacy Policy sets forth misleading examples of 





































































using collected data for the development of Google Photos and Google Translate.  Id. at 29.  
Plaintiff also argues that in support of disclosure, Defendant pieces together different parts of the 
Privacy Policy that are separated by as much as 14 pages.  See Dkt. 25-3 at 4-6; 25-3 at 18.  
“Defendants have the burden to establish the existence of consent.”  See In re Google 
Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 823.  Further, “[i]t also bears repeating that, at the 
motion to dismiss stage, the Court must give Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”  
Id.   In Smith v. Facebook, Inc., the court reviewed Facebook’s policies and found adequate 
disclosure and consent in that Facebook “discloses the precise conduct at issue in this case.”  262 
F. Supp. 3d 943, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  The court also noted, regarding the term “information” 
that, “a contractual term is not ambiguous just because it is broad.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, 
affirming the district court’s dismissal, concluded that the Terms and Policies, which stated that 
Facebook “collect[s] information when you visit or use third party websites and apps that use our 
Services” and “we use all of the information we have about you to show you relevant ads” was 
“[k]nowing authorization” and constituted consent.  Smith v. Facebook, Inc., 745 F. App’x 8, 8-9 
(9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).  Significantly, the Court found that, “A reasonable person 
viewing those disclosures would understand that Facebook maintains the practices of (a) 
collecting its users’ data from third-party sites and (b) later using the data for advertising 
purposes.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
The Privacy Policy in this case does not present the Smith level of specificity in support of 
a motion to dismiss.  “[A]ctivity on third-party sites and apps that use our services” may not be 
understood by a reasonable user to include data from apps that are not associated with Defendant’s 
services.  Dkts. 25-5 at 4; 25-3 at 4.  Further, examples of how the collected data is used may lead 
the reasonable user to conclude that the data is collected to enhance her personal experience, such 
as automatic product updates and dimming one’s screen when the battery is low, or recommending 
a YouTube video the user may like.  Dkts. 25-5 at 3-4; 25-3 at 4.  To the extent data is collected 
for the development of new products, the examples point again to collection of data from 
Defendant’s app or from public information.  For instance, the Privacy Policy states that 
Defendant observed “how people organized their photos in Picasa, Google’s first photos app” to 





































































“design and launch Google Photos” and used “publicly available information to help train 
Google’s language models and build features like Google Translate.”  Dkts. 25-5 at 6, 18; 25-3 at 
6, 18 (emphases added).  These statements may not be understood by a reasonable user to disclose 
collection of her usage information on an independent third-party app.  Disclosure and acceptance 
of statements for a different purpose is not sufficient to establish explicit consent to the collection 
of information regarding use of third-party-apps for the purposes of using that information to 
Defendant’s competitive advantage.  In re Google Inc., 2013 WL 5423918, at *13 (finding that 
users’ acceptance of statements in Google’s TOS “does not establish explicit consent” because it 
was “under a different set of circumstances for a different purpose” and “consent to one [process] 
does not equate to consent to the other”). 
If “the contract language at issue is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, 
with one of those interpretations suggesting consent and another belying it, the Court cannot 
decide the consent issue in [Defendant’s] favor at the motion to dismiss stage.”  In re Facebook, 
Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d at 789.  At the motion to dismiss 
stage, the Court is not prepared to rule that the Privacy Policy establishes an absolute bar to 
Plaintiff’s claims.  Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he has standing 
under Article III of the United States Constitution, and consent is not an absolute defense to all 
claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) is DENIED. 
2. Constitutional and Common-Law Privacy Claims 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his right to privacy under Article I, Section I of the 
California Constitution and the common law intrusion upon seclusion.  Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 74-97.  The 
Court treats these claims together because the common law and constitutional sources of privacy 
protection under California law are closely related.  See In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 
F. Supp. 3d at 828-29; In re Google Location History Litig., 428 F. Supp. 3d at 196.  
“The California Constitution creates a privacy right that protects individuals’ privacy from 
intrusion by private parties.”  In re Google Location History Litigation, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 196.  
To allege a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a 





































































legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; 
and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to a serious invasion of the protected privacy 
interest.”  Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Hill v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 (1994)).  
The California Supreme Court has explained that “[l]egally recognized privacy interests are 
generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and 
confidential information (“informational privacy”); and (2) interests in making intimate personal 
decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference 
(“autonomy privacy”).”  Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 35, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.  Further, 
“[a]ctionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or 
potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy 
right.”  Id. at 37.   
“To state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must allege (1) intrusion into a 
private place, conversation or matter (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  In 
re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 829 (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., 
Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 955 P.2d 469 (1998)).  “This district sets a high 
bar for the requisite intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.” In re Google, Inc. 
Privacy Policy Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to allege a “legally protected privacy interest.”  Dkt. 
24 at 19. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not pleaded that he had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy because the collection at issue was disclosed to him.  Id. at 20.  Further, Defendant 
argues Plaintiff “cannot establish an egregious breach of social norms” because there are no facts 
showing that any dissemination of Plaintiff’s sensitive personal data took place and because of the 
type of “basic activity information” that Plaintiff alleges Defendant collected.  Id.  Plaintiff argues 
that Defendant’s Privacy Policy “is silent as to the existence of Android Lockbox and its 
collection of sensitive personal data, including from third-party (i.e., non-Google) apps.”  Dkt. 29 
at 10.  Plaintiff further argues that the “secretive nature” of Defendant’s conduct and disregard for 





































































user’s privacy are sufficient to plead that this conduct is “highly offensive.”  Id. at 11.  
As discussed above, see supra  IV.B.1, a factual issue remains regarding the scope of 
Plaintiff’s consent.  While Plaintiff may have consented to the collection of activity of third-party-
app usage in some instances, the scope of that consent is not clear.  Thus, there may have been a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and Defendant’s argument that 
Plaintiff has not pleaded that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the collection at 
issue was disclosed to him is not persuasive.  However, even if Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that 
there is a legally protected privacy interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy, “[c]ourts in 
this district have consistently refused to characterize the disclosure of common, basic digital 
information to third parties as serious or egregious violations of social norms.”  In re Google, Inc. 
Privacy Policy Litigation, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 985.  “Many courts have found that the collection—
and even disclosure to certain third parties—of personal information about the users of a 
technology may not constitute a sufficiently egregious breach of social norms to make out a 
common law or constitutional privacy claim.”  In re Google Assistant Privacy Litigation, 457 F. 
Supp. 3d at 830 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Indeed, “[t]hese courts have 
characterized the collection and disclosure of such data as ‘routine commercial behavior.’”  Id. 
(citing Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1025).  For example, in In re iPhone Application Litigation, the 
court found that the information allegedly disclosed to third parties, which included “the unique 
device identifier number, personal data, and geolocation information,” and “app-specific 
information such as which functions Plaintiff performed on the app,” did not constitute an 
egregious breach of social norms even if it was transmitted without plaintiffs’ knowledge and 
consent.  844 F. Supp. 2d at 1050, 1063.   
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected “confidential and sensitive data,” including 
“how long Plaintiff’s [sic] and Class members’ [sic] use certain apps and how often apps were 
open.”  Dkt. 1 ¶ 93.  In the Complaint and at the hearing, no other types of data were alleged and 
the Parties agreed that this was the scope of the allegations regarding the information collected.  
Dkt. 42 25:23-26:9; 35:21-22.  At the hearing, Defendant represented that the app activity data 
was not tied to any personally identifiable information, was anonymized, and was aggregated.  Id. 





































































at 16:1-7; 35:9-14; 35:20-22.  Given the high bar in this district, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 
failed to adequately plead claims for invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion.  The data 
alleged to have been collected without Plaintiff’s consent, the frequency and duration of use of 
certain apps, does not rise to the requisite level of an egregious breach of social norms or intrusion 
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.  See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy 
Litigation, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 985.  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
constitutional and common law privacy claims is GRANTED.    
3. California Civil Code § 1709 Claim 
“The elements of a tort action for deceit under section 1709 of California Civil Code are: 
(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of 
falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) 
resulting damage.”  Chassin Holdings Corp. v. Formula VC Ltd., No. 15-cv-02294-EMC, 2017 
WL 66873, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984-85 
(Cal. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state 
with particularity the circumstances constitution fraud or mistake.  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b).  “Rule 
9(b) ensures that allegations of fraud are specific enough to give defendants notice of the 
particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend 
against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.”  Semegen v. Weidner, 
780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).  Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to 
meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard and define with particularity the basis for his claim, 
including “the time, place and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities 
of the parties to the misrepresentation.”  Dkt. 24 at 25 (citation omitted).  Defendant further 
contends that Plaintiff fails to identify any false or misleading statements or omissions, reliance on 
these statements, and any resulting damage.  Id. at 26-27; Dkt. 33 at 15-16.  
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s Privacy Policy only partially discloses the extent of 
the data being collected, while actually monitoring and collecting sensitive personal data to gain 
an advantage over competitors.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 33, 35-38, 101-05; 29 at 15-16.  Plaintiff alleges that he 
relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations in a prompt during the setup process where Defendant 





































































said it would only collect certain data to offer “a more personalized experience.”  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 33-
34; 29 at 16.  Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he would not have purchased an Android phone had he 
known these statements were false.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 101, 105, 134; 29 at 16; see In re Anthem, Inc. 
Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *35 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) 
(noting that plaintiffs alleged that “had they been aware of the material fact, they would not have 
purchased their affected mobile devices”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Plaintiff has alleged with particularity the specific statements and actions underlying this claim.  
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for violation of Section 1709 is 
DENIED. 
4. California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) Claim 
Civil Code § 1798.150 confers a private right of action for violations of section (a), which 
is related to personal information security breaches.  Further, it explicitly states that “[n]othing in 
this title shall be interpreted to serve as the basis for a private right of action under any other law.”  
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(c).  At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that this claim should be 
dismissed because there are no allegations of a security breach in this case.  Accordingly, 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CCPA claim is GRANTED.  
5. California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)  
The UCL creates a cause of action for business practices that are: (1) unlawful; (2) unfair, 
or (3) fraudulent.  Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200.  Each “prong” of the UCL provides a separate 
and distinct theory of liability.  Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  Further, to have standing to pursue this claim, plaintiffs must show that they “lost 
money or property” because of Defendant’s conduct.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; see In re 
Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d at 804.   
a. Standing 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish statutory standing because personal 
information does not constitute property for purposes of a UCL claim and Plaintiff did not 
sufficiently allege actual reliance.  Dkt. 24 at 29-30.  To establish standing for a UCL claim, “[a] 
plaintiff must show he personally lost money or property because of his own actual and reasonable 





































































reliance on the allegedly unlawful business practices.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1071 (citing Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 330, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
741, 246 P.3d 877 (2011)).  However, there are “innumerable ways in which economic injury 
from unfair competition may be shown.” Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal.4th at 323, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 
246 P.3d 877.  For example, “[a] plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire in a 
transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; (2) have a present or future property interest 
diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to which he or she has a cognizable claim; or (4) 
be required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been 
unnecessary.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff contends that he has alleged that he relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations in 
purchasing and using an Android smartphone “and would not have done so if he had known 
Google would secretly monitor and collect his data from non-Google apps.  Dkt. 29 at 20.  Indeed, 
Plaintiff has alleged that “[h]ad Plaintiff known that his information would be monitored, 
disclosed and misused for Defendants’ sole benefit, he would not have used Defendants’ service.”  
Dkt. 1 ¶ 128; see, e.g., Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal.4th at 330, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741, 246 P.3d 877 
(finding that the assertion that he or she “would not have bought the product but for” the unfair 
business practice is sufficient to establish UCL standing).  Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 
loss of money or property as a result of the UCL violation.  As Plaintiff has pleaded their UCL 
claim under all three prongs, the Court will address in turn whether Plaintiff has sufficiently 
alleged a claim under the UCL.  
b. Unlawful Prong 
“The unlawful prong of the UCL prohibits anything that can properly be called a business 
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1072 (citing Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, 
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 527 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   Section 17200 of 
the Business and Professions Code permits injured customers to “borrow” violations of other laws 
and treat them as unfair competition that is independently actionable.  Id.  Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant engaged in unlawful business practices in violation of the California common law, 





































































California Constitution, California Civil Code § 1709, and the California Consumer Privacy Act.  
Dkt. 1 ¶ 121.  The Court has already considered the adequacy of Plaintiff’s allegations as to the 
privacy rights under the California common law and California Constitution (Section IV.B.2), 
California Civil Code § 1709 (Section IV.B.3), and the California Consumer Privacy Act (Section 
IV.B.4).  Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS any claims based on violation of the California 
common law, California Constitution, and the California Consumer Privacy Act.  On the other 
hand, Plaintiff has stated a UCL claim based on California Civil Code § 1709, which the Court 
found to be sufficiently pleaded.  See supra Section IV.B.3.  Thus, Plaintiff’s UCL claim survives 
to the extent is based upon the alleged violation of Civil Code § 1709, and Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss is DENIED. 
c. Unfair Prong 
“The UCL also creates a cause of action for a business practice that is ‘unfair’ even if not 
specifically proscribed by some other law.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 
1072 (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 29, 63 P.3d 937 (2003)).  “The UCL does not define the term ‘unfair.’  In fact, the proper 
definition of ‘unfair’ conduct against consumers ‘is currently in flux’ among California courts.”  
Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., 
N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012).  “Before Cel-Tech, courts held that ‘unfair’ conduct 
occurs when that practice ‘offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 
1169 (citing S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 861, 85 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 301, 316 (1999)).  The balancing test in S. Bay Chevrolet requires the Court to “weigh the 
utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.”  Davis, 
691 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In Cel-Tech, the California 
Supreme Court established a more concrete definition of “unfair,” defining it as “conduct that 
threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those 
laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 
significantly threatens or harms competition.”  20 Cal. 4th at 187, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 





































































527.  Further, “any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to 
some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.”  
Id. at 186-87.  While the Cel-Tech test did not apply to actions by consumers, “some courts in 
California have extended the Cel-Tech definition to consumer actions.”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1170.  
The parties argue under both the Cel-Tech test and the balancing test under S. Bay Chevrolet. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim under the unfair prong cannot overcome either the 
tethering or balancing test.  Specifically, Defendant argues the predicate claims to which Plaintiff 
“tethers” his UCL claim fails.  Dkt. 24 at 31.  Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to 
establish or explain why the benefits of developing new products, features, and technologies for 
the users and the public are outweighed by any alleged injury to Plaintiff.  Id.  Plaintiff argues that 
Defendant’s collection of consumer data violated California’s public policy of protecting 
fundamental privacy rights and there is no corresponding benefit under the balancing test.  Dkt. 29 
at 22.  At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court cannot say that the benefits from collecting that 
information to develop new products, features, and technologies for the benefit of the users and 
the public necessarily outweighs the harm.  See In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 
3d at 844; In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (“While the benefits of Apple’s 
conduct may ultimately outweigh the harm to consumers, this is a factual determination that 
cannot be made at this stage of the proceedings.”).  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss 
on the unfair prong of the UCL is DENIED. 
d. Fraudulent Prong 
“In order to state a cause of action under the fraud prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must show 
that members of the public are likely to be deceived.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1073 (citing Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1167, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 
(2000)).  “The challenged conduct ‘is judged by the effect it would have on a reasonable 
consumer.’”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 160 
Cal. App. 4th 638, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903, 909 (2008)).  Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 
requirements apply to UCL claims under this prong.  Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 
1125 (9th Cir. 2009).  Thus, claims under this prong must allege “an account of the time, place, 





































































and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 
misrepresentations.”  Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
Here, Plaintiff have met their burden of pleading with particularity the basis of their UCL 
claim under the fraudulent prong.  As stated previously under Section IV.B.3., Plaintiff alleges 
that Defendant’s Privacy Policy only partially discloses the extent of the data being collected, 
including to provide better services and to offer a more personalized experience, while actually 
monitoring and collecting sensitive personal data to obtain information to gain an advantage over 
competitors.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 33, 35-38, 101-05, 127; 29 at 21.  Further, Plaintiff has alleged that he 
reasonably relied upon these representations and if he had “known that his information would be 
monitored, disclosed and misused for Defendants’ sole benefit, he would not have used 
Defendants’ service.”  Dkts. 1 ¶ 128; 29 at 21.  At this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient 
to state a claim.  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the fraudulent prong of the UCL 
is DENIED. 
6. California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) 
The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1770.  To state a claim under CLRA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a 
misrepresentation; (2) reliance on that misrepresentation; and (3) damages caused by that 
misrepresentation.”  In re Sony PS3 Other OS Litigation, 551 F. App’x 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2014).  
“CLRA claims are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test, under which a plaintiff must allege 
that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Gerber Prods. 
Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2008)). 
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to identify any misrepresentation by Defendant 
with the specificity required under Rule 9(b).  Dkt. 24 at 27.  Further, Defendant argues that 
Defendant fails to state a claim under the CLRA because Plaintiff failed to allege any qualifying 
transaction under the statute.  Id. at 27-28.  Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to identify the 
good or service upon which his CLRA claim is based and Defendant’s Android operating system 
cannot constitute a “good” under the CLRA “sale or lease requirement.”  Id. at 28.  Defendant also 





































































argues that Plaintiff failed to adequately allege that he suffered damage as a result of Defendant’s 
allegedly inaccurate representations.  Id. at 28-29.  Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed 
to comply with Civil Code § 1780(d), which requires that Plaintiff concurrently “file an affidavit 
stating facts showing that the action has been commenced in a county described in this section as a 
proper place for the trial of the action.”  Id. at 29. 
Similar to Plaintiff’s section 1709 claim under Section IV.B.3, Plaintiff has alleged that 
Defendant’s Privacy Policy only partially discloses the extent of the data being collected, while 
actually monitoring and collecting sensitive personal data to obtain information to gain an 
advantage over competitors.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 33, 35-38, 101-05, 132-33; 29 at 15-16, 18.  Additionally, 
Plaintiff alleges that he relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations in a prompt during the setup 
process where Defendant said it would only collect certain data to offer “a more personalized 
experience.”  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 33-34; 29 at 16.  Plaintiff alleges that he would not have purchased an 
Android phone had he known these statements were false.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 101, 105, 134; 29 at 16, 19; 
see also In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (finding that the plaintiffs 
articulated a damages claim that is cognizable under the CLRA because plaintiffs alleged that they 
overpaid for their iDevices as a result of defendant’s failure to disclose its information tracking 
and collection practices with respect to the free apps).  Further, Plaintiff’s allegations are not 
premised on the Android operating system, but the sale of the Android device itself.  See In re 
Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 58 F. Supp. 3d at 981-82 (“The Android-powered device is the 
‘tangible chattel’ that makes Google the proper target of a CLRA claim.”); In re iPhone 
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (finding that plaintiffs’ claim “thus arises out of the 
sale of a good, and not the downloading of free software”).   
However, Civil Code § 1780(d) states that “[i]f a plaintiff fails to file the affidavit required 
by this section, the court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, dismiss the 
action without prejudice.  Plaintiff has not filed the affidavit “stating facts showing that the action 
has been commenced in a county described in this section as a proper place for the trial of the 
action.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(d).  Thus, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert a CLRA claim.  
See In re Apple and AT & T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D. 





































































Cal. 2011) (dismissing the CLRA claims without prejudice because they did not file the required 
affidavits); Gentges v. Trend Micro Inc., No. C 11-5574 SBA, 2012 WL 2792442, at *6 n.4 (N.D. 
Cal. July 9, 2012) (finding that Plaintiffs’ admitted failure to file the requisite certificate under 
California Civil Code § 1780(d) deprives Plaintiff of standing to assert a CLRA claim); see also 
Rossetti v. Stearn’s Products, Inc., CV 16-1875-GW(SSx), 2016 WL 3277295, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
June 6, 2016) (“Indeed, courts have applied the [Section 1780(d) affidavit] requirement even to 
cases that were filed directly in federal court.”); but see Sandoval v. PharmaCare US, Inc., 145 F. 
Supp. 3d 986, 999 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that because the requirement is procedural, “it does 
not apply to CLRA claims filed in federal court”).  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff’s CLRA claim is GRANTED. 
7. Breach of Contract 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege breach of any provision of the TOS or that 
Defendant collected any information other than what it properly disclosed in its Privacy Policy.  
Dkt. 24 at 33.  Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to 
show how any alleged breach by Defendant caused him harm. 
To plead a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) the existence of a 
contract with Defendants, (2) their performance under that contract, (3) Defendants breached that 
contract, and (4) they suffered damages.”  In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 
831 (citation omitted).   
Plaintiff adequately alleges the parties entered into a contract, agreeing to abide by 
Defendant’s TOS, which includes the Privacy Policy.  Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 138-40.  Further, Plaintiff alleges 
that Defendant lacked consent to collect sensitive personal information to gain a competitive edge 
in the market against its rivals, but did so, collecting information such as the frequency in which 
Plaintiff and class members opened non-Google apps and the duration of time spent on the third-
party-apps.  Dkts. 1 ¶¶ 103, 142-43; 29 at 23.  By doing so, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 
“breached its contract with Plaintiff and Class members.”  Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 143-44.  “A contract 
provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more reasonable 
interpretations” and “where the language leaves doubt as to the parties’ intent, the motion to 





































































dismiss must be denied.”  Williams v. Apple, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 892, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
As stated previously in Section IV.B.1 discussing consent, the parties have proffered varying 
interpretations of the Privacy Policy.  Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s breach directly 
caused damages, including that Plaintiff would not have purchased an Android Smartphone 
otherwise or would not have paid as high a price, his Android device is now worth less, and the 
unlawful collection has resulted in a “diminution in the value of his personal information.”  Dkts. 
1 ¶ 145; 29 at 23; see In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 
at 802 (“The plaintiffs can seek damages for the detriment caused by the breach.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
breach of contract claim is DENIED. 
8. Breach of Implied Contract 
At the hearing, Plaintiff indicated that this claim was included in the alternative to the 
breach of contract claim and that to the extent that the Court finds that there was an express 
contract, this claim should be dismissed.  As discussed in Section IV.B.7, the Court has reasoned 
that Plaintiff adequately alleges the parties entered into a contract.  Accordingly, Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of implied contract claim is GRANTED.  
9. Unjust Enrichment 
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the class, alleges a claim against Defendant for unjust 
enrichment.  Courts have determined that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action.  See In re 
iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1031; Hill v. Roll Int’l 
Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1307.  Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim does not properly state 
an independent cause of action and must be dismissed.  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment cause of action is GRANTED.  
10. Request for Relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations 
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory 





































































judgment should be dismissed because each of his underlying claims fail and this claim “may not 
stand alone.”  Dkt. 24 at 34.  However, as reasoned above, some of Plaintiff’s underlying claims 
have survived the motion to dismiss stage.  See Wolf v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C11-01337 
WHA, 2011 WL 4831208, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011) (“Plaintiff's operative complaint 
sought declaratory relief.  This claim is actually a request for remedy—to weigh it, the court must 
look to its underlying claims. Until plaintiff's claims are finally determined, it is impossible for 
this order to say that declaratory relief will not be in order.”) (citing Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 
207 F.3d 1177, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000)).  Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim. 
11. California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) 
Plaintiff’s final claim is a request for relief under CIPA.  Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 174-79.  The California 
Legislature enacted CIPA in response to “advances in science and technology [that] have led to 
the development of new devices and techniques for the purposes of eavesdropping upon private 
communications” and prohibits unauthorized interceptions of communications in order “to protect 
the right of privacy.”  Cal. Penal Code § 630.  Section 631 makes it unlawful for any person to use 
a “machine, instrument, or contrivance” to “intentionally tap[], or make[] any unauthorized 
connection . . . with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument” or to read, attempt 
to read, or learn the “contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the 
same is in transit or passing over any wire, line or cable” without the consent of all parties to the 
communication.  “The California Supreme Court has held that § 631 protects against three distinct 
types of harms: ‘intentional wiretapping, willfully attempting to learn the contents or meaning of a 
communication in transit over a wire, and attempting to use or communicate information obtained 
as a result of engaging in either of the two previous activities.’”  In re Yahoo Mail Litigation, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 1016, 1036 (quoting Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 187, 192, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
883, 583 P.2d 737 (1978)). 
 Defendant contends that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege any 
“message, report, or communication” intercepted by Defendant and failed to allege how 
“monitoring” app-activity data could constitute the interception of a “message, report, or 





































































communication.”  Dkt. 24 at 22.  Further, Defendant argues Plaintiff did not allege the “contents” 
of any purported communications allegedly intercepted by Defendant.  Id. at 23.  Finally, 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s CIPA claim fails because the type of data Plaintiff alleges 
Defendant collects does not amount to the “contents” of a “communication” under CIPA.  Id.  
Plaintiff argues that he has successfully alleged a CIPA claim “by pleading that Google used a 
hidden program to intercept communications between Android users and third-party apps without 
their consent.”  Dkt. 29 at 13.  Plaintiff further argues that Defendant mischaracterizes what types 
of information qualify as “content” as opposed to “record information” or “routine commercial 
data.”  Id.   
 “The analysis for a violation of CIPA is the same as that under the federal Wiretap Act.”  
Cline v. Reetz-Laiolo, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citation omitted).  The 
Wiretap Act defines the term “contents” as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510.  The Ninth Circuit has held that “record 
information regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the 
communication” does not qualify as “contents.”  In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 
(9th Cir. 2014); see also U.S. v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that 
information about a telephone call’s “origination, length and time” was non-content “record” 
information).  For example, in Brodsky v. Apple Inc., the court determined that Plaintiffs could not 
maintain their CIPA claim predicated on “Plaintiffs’ ‘login activities,’ or presumably Plaintiffs’ 
user names and passwords,” which constituted “record information.”  No. 19-CV-00712-LHK, 
2019 WL 4141936, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2019) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ CIPA claim). 
 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant collected data on when and how often an Android 
Smartphone user opens and runs non-Google apps and the amount of time spent on the apps.  Dkt. 
1 ¶ 25.  This alone is more akin to log in activities, and In re Zynga forecloses a CIPA claim 
predicated on this type of record information.  Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege the contents of 
any communication that Defendant allegedly intercepted.  Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CIPA claim. 






































































For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(1).  The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Specifically, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
claims for California Civil Code § 1709, UCL, breach of contract, and request for relief under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act are DENIED.  Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against 
Defendant for violations of constitutional and common-law privacy claims, CLRA, and CIPA are 
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 
against Defendant for violations of the CCPA, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment 
are GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by February 16, 2021.  Plaintiff may not add new 
causes of action or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Failure to cure the defects identified by this Order will be 
subject to dismissal with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: February 2, 2021 
 
  
SUSAN VAN KEULEN 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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